Damages by Power, Layton A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 30 
Number 2 Washington Case Law-1954 
5-1-1955 
Damages 
Layton A. Power 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Layton A. Power, Washington Case Law, Damages, 30 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 126 (1955). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol30/iss2/7 
This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
from parole supervision on July 13, 1949. On March 11, 1950, he was sentenced for
forgery committed while on parole. Petitioner asks for a construction of RCW
9.92.080 that would prevent his confinement for the latter offense to begin until the
expiration of his previous fifteen year maximum sentence. The statute reads inter ali:
".... whenever a person while under sentence of a felony commits another felony and
sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until the
expiration of all prior terms. .. ." The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding
that the statute in question should be interpreted as if the italicized words were added:
"... whenever a person while under sentence of a felony commits another felony and
is sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until
expiration of incarceration under all prior terms. ..
DAMAGES
Damages for a Private Nuisance. In the two recent cases of Riblet
v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co.,1 the plaintiff sought damages for
injury caused by dust from defendant's cement plant. Plaintiff had
built his "dream house" on high ground overlooking the plant; and
was continually troubled by such annoyances as sludge in his swimming
pool, encrustation of cement dust on his house, and a dusty sensation
in his respiratory system. On the first trial, the trial court dismissed
the action, relying on the case of Powell v. Superior Portland Cement,
Inc.'
The decision in the well-known Powell case was handed down by
the Washington Supreme Court in 1942. In that case it was held that
one who voluntarily purchases property in a manufacturing community
cannot be compensated for any injury caused by such inconveniences
as dust, smoke or gases that are a necessary incident of lawful industrial
operations. Neither injunction nor damages were granted. The con-
curring judges rested their opinion on the proposition that plaintiff
had failed to prove any substantial injury to his property, and that no
damages could be allowed for mere diminution of personal enjoyment
of one's property. The court had ample authority for denying the
injunction;' but in denying damages, it overruled much Washington
authority to the contrary.4 Shortly after the Powell decision, an ex-
cellent comment in the Washington Law Review' soundly criticized
141 Wn.2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952), and 145 Wash. Dec. 323, 274 P2d 574 (1954).
2 15 Wn.2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
aBartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306 (1924) ; Mattson v.
Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 282 Pac. 848 (1929).
4 Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., supra note 3; Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co.,
supra note 3; Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 Pac. 450
(1916) ; Sterrett v. Northport Mining and Smelting Co., 30 Wash. 164, 70 Pac. 266
(1902).
5 Comment, Recovery of Damages for Private Nuisance, 18 WAsH. L. Rxv. 31
(1943).
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the holding as one that did violence both to precedente and to statutory
provisions." The author predicted that in view of overwhelming
authority to the contrary, both in this jurisdiction and in others, the
Powell decision would be re-examined.
This prediction proved to be quite accurate. When the decision of
the trial court in the first Riblet case was appealed in 1952, the Supreme
Court limited the Powell case to its facts and held it not to be con-
trolling in the case at bar, which was then remanded for a new trial. On
retrial, the plaintiff was awarded damages for depreciation in the
rental value of his property caused by the dust nuisance over the
period not barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff again
appealed, contending that the amount awarded was grossly inadequate,
and that the trial court had erred in not allowing damages for personal
discomfort. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to the
property damage and also awarded $1000' for personal discomfort,
thus reversing that portion of the trial court's judgment which held
that to grant damages for both personal discomfort and for injury to
property would subject the defendant to double damages. The court
acknowledged that the latter award was "seemingly at variance" with
the views of the concurring judges in the Powell case.
In awarding damages for injury to plaintiff's property, the court
seems to be returning to the position it had adhered to prior to the
Powell case.' In allowing plaintiff to recover for personal discomfort,
it has adopted the prevailing rule that personal damages are recoverable
as a separate item in an action on a private nuisance, and that such an
award does not subject a defendant to double damages."0 Before this
case, no Washington decision had directly held on this point, though
the court, had strongly implied that such damages might be recover-
able." The apparent effect of the two Riblet cases is to overrule. both
0 Cases cited note 4 supra.
7 RCW 7.48.020 declares that in the case of a nuisance an action may be brought
... by any person whose property is affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessenedby the nuisance.. ..
8 There was no express allowance for prospective damages in this award, as is
usually made in cases involving a permanent nuisance. It might also be noted that the
figure of $1000 was arrived at rather arbitrarily. However, this can probably be ex-
plained by the fact that the court was rendering somewhat of a: compromise verdict in
hope of terminating a protracted and profitless litigation.
"Supra note 4.
20 McCoamic, DAmAGES, 503, § 127 (1935) ; Note, 142 A.L.R. 1307 (1943) ; Millet
v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 145 Minn. 475, 177 N.W. 641 (1920); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Ruble, 119 Okla. 37, 126 P2d 526 (1942).
"1 Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co., supra note 3, where the jury found no substantial
property, damage, but allowed damages because plaintiff's home had been rendered less
inviting and less comfortable.
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the majority and the concurring opinions in the Powell case, thus re-
turning this jurisdiction to the majority rule on this point.
Interest on Disputed Claims. A narrow issue with a troubled history
in this jurisdiction is the question of whether or not interest is allowable
on a claim where plaintiff sues on a contract to pay money, and the
defendant disputes the amount due. A reading of our cases on the
subject will reveal no small amount of confusion as to just what facts
must be present in order that interest may be allowed on such a claim.
In the case of Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co., 2 the court
made an attempt to clarify the matter.
That case was an action brought by Mall on an open account for
goods sold and delivered. Far West disputed the amount due on the
account, claiming that it had not received certain items of merchandise.
It was Far West's position that if a defendant in an action such as this
one in good faith disputes all or part of the plaintiff's claim, it becomes
an unliquidated demand, and will not bear interest prior to judgment.
The trial court found for the defendant on the disputed items, and re-
fused to allow interest on the balance. On appeal, the Supreme Court
held that it was error not to allow interest ". . . because the claim is for
an amount due upon a specific contract for the payment of money and
the amount due is determinable by computation with reference to a
fixed standard contained in the contract, without reliance on opinion or
discretion."'" For convenience, the court called this type of claim a
"determinable claim."
As a general rule, a liquidated claim will bear interest before judg-
ment, while an unliquidated claim will not. A claim that is fixed, or
one that is ascertainable by computation is usually considered liqui-
dated.1" Washington, however, classifies claims not fixed as un-
liquidated, and has alternately allowed " and disallowed" interest on
them. In the case of Dickenson Fire and Pressed Brick Co. v. F. T.
12 145 Wash. Dec. 145, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
13 Id. at 161, 273 P.2d at 663, 664.
1447 C.J.S. 28, § 19 (1946).
15 Ibid.; MCCORmicK, DAMAGES, 213, § 54 (1935). McCormick says, "A claim is
liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute
the amount with exactness, without reliance on opinion or discretion ... "
'
6 Dickenson Fire and Pressed Brick Co. v. F. T. Crowe & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115
Pac. 1087 (1911); Parks v. Elmore, 59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910); Modern
Irrigation & Land Co. v. Neely, 81 Wash. 38, 142 Pac. 458 (1914); Barbo v. Norris,
138 Wash. 627, 245 Pac. 414 (1926).
17 Ryan v. Plath, 20 Wn.2d 663, 148 P.2d 946 (1944) ; Wright v. City of Tacoma,
87 Wash. 334, 151 Pac. 837 (1915); Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218
(1951).
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Crowe & Co.,"8 the court made the unqualified statement that interest
is allowable on a claim under a contract to pay money where the
amount due is ascertainable by computation, and that counterclaims
and setoffs won't preclude recovery. In several other cases, interest
was allowed without discussion. 9 In Parks v. Elmore,"0 the court held
that interest is allowable on an unliquidated demand where the amount
is ascertainable by computation. A similar decision was reached in
Barbo v. Norris." In one case,2" the court held that interest is allow-
able on an unliquidated demand where the equities of the case so
demand. This holding stands by itself.
On the other hand, there is a sizable number of cases where interest
was not allowed. Interest was refused in Ryan v. Plath3 because
"certain items of the account were controverted." In Wright v. City
of Tacoma,24 interest was not allowed, the court holding that "Where
... the demand is for something which required evidence to establish
the quantity or amount of the thing sold, or the value of the services
rendered, interest will not be allowed prior to judgment."2 This pas-
sage from the Wright case was quoted with approval in the more recent
case of Meyer v. Strom."8
The extent to which this decision does away with the confusion on
the subject is open to question. The court could have followed either
of two distinct and opposite lines of cases and cleared up the matter
once and for all, but instead, it limited its holding to a particular type of
fact pattern, leaving the status of much preceding case authority still
in doubt. As far as it goes, however, this holding does shed considerable
light on the matter. Within the fact pattern to which this holding is
limited, i.e., where there is a claim on a contract to pay money, and
the amount due is ascertainable by computation with reference to a
fixed standard contained in the contract, this decision sets at rest'the
conflict shown by the cases discussed above. It is readily seen that
this fact pattern includes a large number of the possible cases where
the issue of interest on damages might arise. It is submitted that the
court has made a substantial contribution to certainty and predicta-
I 8Supra note 16.
10 Royal Dairy Products Co. v. Spokane Dairy Products Co, 129 Wash. 424, 225
Pac. 412 (1924) ; Hartinan Shoe Co. v. Hanson, 135 Wash. 512, 238 Pac. 17 (1925).S Supra note 16.
21 Supra note 16.22 Modem Irrigation & Land Co. v. Neeley, supra note 16.23 Supra note 17.
2 4 Supra note 17.
25 87 Wash. at 353, 151 Pac. at 844.
26 Supra note 17.
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biity in the law of damages in this state; but that it missed an ex-
cellent opportunity to make a much greater one.
LAYTON A. POWER
Cost Plus Contract. Walsh Services, Inc. v. Feek, 145 Wash. Dec. 269, 274 P.2d 117
(1954) involved a contract to remodel a house on what the court construed to be a
cost plus basis. When the job was finished, plaintiff building contractor presented a
bill to defendant that came to about double the price quoted in plaintiff's original
estimate. The defendant refused to pay the bill and plaintiff sought to foreclose a
mechanic's lien on defendant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision that plaintiff could recover only what the job should have cost. This figure
was arrived at by the computations of a reputable architect. It was held that a cost
plus contractor must exercise the same skill and ability he would use on a contract for
a fixed sum, and that the contractor must show that money he claims to have expended
on the job was necessarily expended for labor and materials on the job. If the con-
tractor cannot show these facts, he may recover only the reasonable cost, plus his
percentage.
Reasonableness of Expense Incurred. In Cudmore v. Tiomsland, 44 Wn.2d 308, 266
P2d 1058 (1954), plaintiff sued for defendant's breach of a warranty that certain
livestock was free from disease. The only issue before the Supreme Court was the
amount of damages. The court sustained defendant's contention that the amount of a
veterinarian's bill was not established by competent evidence, since there was no
testimony as to the reasonableness of the bill. The court relied on Carr v. Martin,
35 Wn.2d 753, 215 P2d 411 (1950), as authority for its holding. The Cart case and
those cited therein involved medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred as a result
of personal injuries, however, and may be rather dubious authority for the holding in
the Cudmore case.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce-Child Custody. In Habick v. Habich', the mother was
awarded the custody of the children, then six and four years of age, in
1948, in an interlocutory decree of divorce. For three years the children
had lived at the respective homes of the mother's mother, the father's
parents, and of the mother, followed by nearly two years at the home of
the father. This had been due to the father's failure to make support
money payments, the mother's past ill health, and the father's unwill-
ingness to surrender the children during school terms. When the mother
remarried and desired to take the children back, the father instituted
this proceeding to modify the divorce decree by transferring the custody
of the children to him. The court found that the mother and her new
husband were "very suitable as guardians for these growing children"2
and that there were adequate school, church, and recreational facilities,
'44 Wn2d 195, 266 P.2d 346 (1954).
2 rd. at 200, 266 P.2d at 349.
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